

Dissecting Revolution: A Study of Spanish Anatomy

John Locke

Professor Susan Hollis

The Art of Revolution

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With at least a rudimentary knowledge of history, it is difficult to miss apparent patterns and cycles inherent in the evolution of cultures and societies. In any society, a group of people gains power and rules for a certain period of time until factions based on contrary ideologies begin to coalesce, leading to conflict between the ruling class and the opposition. Quite often, as the opposition gains momentum, the ruling class is compelled to resort to extreme measures to maintain their control. Eventually, and perhaps inevitably, tensions build to a dangerous level until an explosion of violent confrontation takes place. The aftermath seems to have its own patterns and cycles, occasionally leading to a repeat of the whole process. Although the process of revolution does not always lead to a violent climax, there are many examples that do.

The late Crane Brinton, American historian and Harvard professor, was considered an expert on the subject of the revolutionary process. In his book, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, Brinton reviews four separate revolutions: the English of the 1640's, the American, the great French, and the Russian. By first analyzing the events leading up to each, then the actual revolution and finally its aftermath, he establishes a series of common "uniformities" (7). The fact that he is successful in finding correlations between these vastly different events—philosophically, geographically, as well as chronologically speaking—only serves to reinforce the theory that there is a natural evolution in societal interaction. Identifying this process and applying it to the establishment of the Second Republic of Spain in the 1930's, and its demise as a result of the Spanish Civil War will enable systematic analysis of what, at face value appears to be

a period of time in which the Spanish people lived in a constant state of mayhem and chaos, with numerous factions advocating diametrically opposed ideals.

It is possible to trace the instability that ultimately set the stage for General Francisco Franco's rise to power back at least as far as 1808 when the Spanish monarchy surrendered to Napoleon. For the rest of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the character of the constitution of Spain was challenged and revised mainly by two opposing authorities, the church and the army. Each would use their power to influence or intimidate the monarchy in an attempt to further their own particular agenda. The death of King Ferdinand in 1834 led to the First Carlist War, in which Don Carlos, brother of Ferdinand, with the aid of the church and a group of like-minded individuals, contested the succession of Queen Isabella. The war ended in 1837 with the victory of Isabella's supporters. Compromise between the victors and the vanquished, including the acceptance of Carlist military officers in the army ultimately led to further instability and conflict.

Power passed back and forth between liberal and conservative factions of the military while the monarchy struggled to maintain its position of perceived, rather than actual authority. The liberals advocated a republican form of government with limited provincial autonomy while the conservatives, in league with the church preferred a traditional, essentially feudalistic hierarchy. Queen Isabella was forced into exile by General Prim in 1868 and the Liberals attempted to govern with King Amadeo I, brother of the King of Italy and Duke of Aosta acting as figurehead. As a result of continuing violence and conflict, Amadeo abdicated and the First Spanish Republic was proclaimed. The governing body was weak, however and eventually succumbed to the

pressure of the opposition, who upon assuming control, reinstated the monarchy and placed Isabella's son Alfonso XII on the throne. For the remaining twenty-five years of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the parliamentary government was relatively stable. Elections were held, however results were always a forgone conclusion due to backroom deals between the two major parties.

The last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century saw increased trade throughout Europe and those in a position of power in Spain, with unrestricted access to its rich natural resources benefited greatly. The common people, those who did not have financial or social status as a means of influence were excluded from the governing process and as a result, rather than benefiting from the boon, they were, instead exploited by those who did.

And so, in three short paragraphs, one hundred years of conflict, war, and *coups d'etat* have been summarized in order to set the stage for one of the most complicated periods of political turmoil in the history of Europe. With the help of Brinton's established "uniformities," we will attempt to chart the chronology of events of the first 39 years of 20<sup>th</sup> century Spain and classify them accordingly. In the process, we will see if, in fact, Brinton has accurately depicted the process of revolution as a predictable series of events with prescribed stages and expected outcomes.

First, Brinton finds it useful to define "perfect equilibrium" in order to better identify the symptomatic state of a society on the brink of revolt. In his words, perfect equilibrium "might be defined as a society every member of which had at a given moment all that he could possibly desire and was in a state of absolute contentment...in which every member responds predictably to a given stimuli" (15). Needless to say, taken

as an absolute, any society could then be assumed to be on the brink of revolution. Obviously, the degree to which one or more segments of a society is “discontented” will indicate the level of risk of revolt. Spain at the turn of the last century was certainly not filled with contented citizens. In fact, it is most appropriate to consider the population on a sliding scale of discontentedness. The ruling class (liberal or conservative— depending on the year or sometimes the month) was not content due to the persistent threat of the opposition. The opposition was not content until they were in power. The conservatives were not content with the progressive nature of various factions in the government and the liberals were not content with the influence that the church and traditionalists were able to apply. The separatists were not content as long as they were under the control of a central government. The proletariat was not content with the conditions in which it was forced to work. The peasants were not content with the fact that they did not own the land on which they toiled. And finally, the bourgeoisie was not content knowing that any minute any one of these other factions could ignite the next unrest, which never aided in the advancement of their well being.

Brinton begins his dissection by exploring the economics of a society in a pre-revolutionary state (36). First, he submits that in the four societies he surveyed, the majority of citizens were prosperous. In Hugh Thomas’s *The Spanish Civil War*, Spain is characterized in the final decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as being “prosperous” (13). Whether liberal or conservative, the ruling class, at least was quite well off. Next, Brinton notes that the presiding government (later referred to as the “Old Regime”) is financially strapped. Spain had just lost the Spanish American War and as a consequence, no longer

possessed Cuba as a colony. Northern Morocco became a Spanish conquest but by the end of the first decade of the 1900's, the price of possession was becoming increasingly beyond her grasp. Thus, the Spanish government was in need of cash to fund her military occupation. Brinton's third economic uniformity of a pre-revolutionary society contends that certain groups feel that they are being economically inhibited by government policies. Catalonia, according to Thomas became irritated "with the incompetence of the government at Madrid [which] led the new rich of Barcelona at the end of the [19<sup>th</sup>] century to embrace Catalan nationalism" (14). The people of the Basque region of the north also considered themselves separate from Castilian Spain and saw themselves as better able to determine the path to their own economic and social success. A growing anarchist movement among the proletariat was also indicative of the frustration with their inability to excel within the structure of the government's economic policies. Finally, Brinton notes that class economics are not necessarily exploited as a means of motivation for action. At least in the early stages of the move toward revolution, this observation can be made of the Spanish condition. The proletariat was more concerned with self-determination and improved working conditions rather than economic advancement. Attention to the plight of the peasants and working class did not take center stage until the end of the first decade. In response to the exploitation of the proletariat, by 1914, there were two general trade unions: the *Confederacion Nacional de Trabajo* (CNT) with anarchist sentiments and an unwillingness to cooperate with the established government to work for change from within and the *Union General de Trabajadores* (UGT), which was Socialist in philosophy and attempted to work within the system for reform. In

addition, a growing, underground Communist movement was beginning to flourish. These attempts to organize provided the working class and peasants with their first voice in national affairs. As a result of numerous strikes and work stoppages, the bourgeoisie gradually became aware of their plight.

Brinton focuses next on the nature of the government in place just prior to the revolution. He uncovers another uniformity in the fact that these societies make an effort to “reform the machinery of government” (39). The image of an indifferent government hanging on to the status quo is more stereotype than reality. He points out that in all four of his case studies, the “old regime” attempts to enact reforms to address the concerns of the discontented. From 1910 through 1912, the leader of the government, Jose Canalejas implemented a series of reforms, which attempted compromise in the areas of education, tax relief for the poor, Catalan autonomy and the influence of the church. An anarchist assassinated Canalejas in 1912. The government’s enthusiasm for reform died with him. Various iterations of liberal and conservative governments followed until 1923 when General Miguel Primo de Rivera established a dictatorship. His attempts to bring order to Spain were temporarily successful and even though his rule was far from democratic, compared to the coming fascist regime, he was a benevolent ruler. He resumed the reform of the machinery of government by creating new public works programs, renegotiating trade agreements, and collaborating with the UGT.

A society is one step closer to revolt when the movement begins to win the hearts and minds of its thinkers. Brinton refers to this period in revolutionary momentum as “The Transfer of Allegiance of the Intellectuals” (39). The leadership of the UGT in the

late 20's was divided with regard to the decision to collaborate with the Primo regime. Two of its leaders, Largo Caballero and Fernando Besteiro saw the opportunity for collaboration as a way to work within the system to achieve the Socialist trade union's goals and gain the upper hand over the rival CNT. Other UGT leaders including Tuero Prieto and Fernando De Los Rois were against cooperation and saw it as "selling out" the rank and file. The collaborationist view won out and the UGT enjoyed a quasi-official status within the government, unlike the CNT and other trade unions and social movements, which were systematically persecuted. Dolores Ibaruri, also known as La Pasionaria, a leading organizer in the Spanish Communist movement writes about her experiences evading Primo's secret police and of numerous incarcerations in her autobiography, *They Shall Not Pass*. As the Primo regime found themselves more often on the side of business rather than the workers, the UGT rank and file's enthusiasm for cooperation dwindled. As part of their agreement with the Dictatorship the union leadership discouraged strikes and working conditions continued to deteriorate. Those strikes that did take place were met by swift government reprisals, including "the dissolution of 150 union sections, 93 worker's centers were closed and hundreds of Socialists were arrested" (Preston 22). Eventually, Largo, Besteiro and other pragmatists realized that further support of the Primo Regime was not only detrimental to the objectives of the union, but also to their political survival.

Another uniformity dictates that the success of the opposition is secured when the revolutionists receive "buy-in" from the military. Primo alienated the armed forces by upsetting the established system of promotions. When the officers of certain groups

protested, he simply disbanded the offending groups. Even the King, who up until that point tolerated most of Primo's actions, took offense to his meddling.

Finally, in one last comparison of Brinton's observed uniformities and the events of pre-revolution Spain, he states that, "...there is a point, or several points, where constituted authority is challenged by the illegal acts of revolutionists. In such instances, the routine response of any authority is to have recourse to force, police or military. Our authorities made such a response but in each case with a striking lack of success" (86). We have already stated examples of Primo's attempts to quell the opposition. The fact that on January 28, 1930, the Dictator resigned is proof of his unsuccessful efforts. By the following spring, in response to elections in which the supporters of the monarchy were overwhelmingly defeated, the King followed the Dictator into exile.

One last word in our anatomy lesson of pre-revolution uniformities is worth mentioning. "The first stage of revolution ends...with the victory of the revolutionists after what is rather dramatic than serious bloodshed. The hated old regime has been conquered so easily" (90). In terms of loss of life, the overthrow of the Dictatorship and the monarchy was negligible. Human rights were violated, opposition groups were persecuted, and the media was censored. But relative to what was to come, the revolution of 1930 was a virtual siesta.

Attempting to summarize the events leading up to the fall of Primo's dictatorship is challenging. It pales in comparison to the challenge of composing a sufficient narrative of the politics behind the establishment of the Second Republic. There were so many parties and players whose influence, or lack thereof set the stage for its tumultuous rise

and reign. There is an old sports or theater adage that says something about needing a program to know the players. A map to navigate the highways and back alleys of Spanish politics in 1930 or at least an address book to locate the various residents along the way would certainly be of help. Over the next eight years, the organizations would read like the noodles in a boiling alphabet soup. To the extreme left, to name just a few, there were the Anarchist Youth (FIJL), Anarchist Doctrinal Vanguard (FAI), and the Anarcho-Syndicalist Trade Union (CNT). Moving toward the center of the left, the Communists were divided into Stalinists (PSUC) and Trotskyists (POUM), who also had their own version of the Boy Scouts (JCI). Just to the right of these groups were the Socialists, split generally into two opposing camps, the PSOE, who advocated revolution and the UGT, who were in favor of achieving their goals through an evolutionary, mainstream process. Just to the left of center were the military officers (URMA) who favored the establishment of the Republic. The closer one gets to the center of the continuum, the more likely one would be to label themselves a Republican.

These leftist groups advocated a wide spectrum of reform to the traditional Spanish system: from better working conditions to an all out proletariat revolt; from the separation of church and state to the abolition of religion and the destruction of all things sacred; and from land reform to the collectivization of all private property.

Stepping over the ideological void that separated left from right, the landowners and capitalists, whose best interest was served when the working class was reasonably content, were probably the most moderate of the right wing— but they could hardly be classified as moderate. Next, the Monarchists were split between the Alfonsians and the

Carlists. The former advocated a unified, central government while the latter was more tolerant of limited provincial rule. Various Catholic groups eventually coalesced into the *Confederacion Espanola de Derechas Autonomas* Party (CEDA), which was extremely conservative and (appropriately) saw the extreme left as a direct threat to their way of life. They too had a youth group (JAP). The Falangists, although they disassociated themselves from the CEDA had much in common with them. They were slightly to the right of the Catholic Party and slightly to the left of the Fascists, who expounded the same diatribe of racial purity and national supremacy as the Nazis in Germany.

The thought of forging a coalition government based on these very differing ideologies seems like fantasy and, in fact it was. The initial administration of the Second Republic was Bourgeois in nature and composed mostly of Socialists and intellectuals who were labeled as radicals in the past decades. These “mellowed” radicals had developed reputations as anti-clerics and were regarded with great suspicion by the conservatives. The government also included members with rightist leanings, including two Catholics in the cabinet in the ministry of the interior. A few members were recruited from the provinces where the desire for autonomy had long been expressed. This group of vastly diverse idealists was lead by Alcala Zamora, first Prime Minister of the new Republic.

Brinton entitles the first chapter dealing with the new regime, “The Rule of the Moderates.” It seems that yet another uniformity may be drawn between his anatomical findings and our case study. The new Republic was brimming with enthusiasm and well-intentioned reformist sentiment. Although much of its accompanying philosophy would

hardly seem moderate to its critics, the fact that those who criticized were able to do so with no great fear of reprisals is testament to its moderate character. In fact, those remaining who were loyal to the monarchy and the military officers who gained the most from the Primo regime immediately coalesced into a strong oppositional force. Through artful propaganda and an efficient intelligence network—both remnants of the old regime—the right wing did its best to thwart the efforts of the new government. Their organization and efficacy was not necessarily indicative of their popularity. On May 10, 1931, the monarchists, who were closely associated with the church, demonstrated in an attempt to rally sentiment. The public reaction was not hospitable and a series of church burnings in Madrid and other cities has been interpreted as their response. But these events may possibly be attributed to the monarchists and clergy, themselves as there is speculation that the fires were planned and executed by *agents provocateurs* (Preston (43).

Threats to the fledgling Second Republic did not only originate on the right. Brinton notes that, “the moderates, once in power, turn out to have less homogeneity and party discipline than they seemed to have when they were in opposition” (122). The Republic was born in the midst of the Great Depression. Spain’s financial standing was on shaky ground. The costs of the previous Dictatorship’s various public works initiatives and the military campaign in Morocco had created significant deficits. The new Republic, which enjoyed the support of those oppressed by the Old Regime, was faced with the enormous challenge of attending to their neglected concerns without the luxury of sufficient resources. Any significant effort at relieving the plight of the oppressed would

be at the expense of the landowners and capitalists. As Preston observes, “thus, the Socialists’ hopeful vision of a social-reforming Republic was to leave them trapped between an impatient popular clamor for more and faster reform and the determined resistance to change of the possessing classes” (76). Opinion within the Socialist party was divided between those who favored supporting the new government and those who felt the party had the most to gain by its failure. Those who advocated support prevailed but the alliance was fragile. The further left on the continuum, the less solidarity. Even within the camp of Republican collaborators, there were those who believed the Republic was the culmination of the rise against Primo and the King and those who saw it as a stepping-stone on the path to a proletariat revolution.

Then government’s first task was to draft a constitution. This was a painful process, which in the end, contributed to the alienation of both the extreme left and most of the right. Compromise resulted in policies that were too moderate for the left and unacceptably liberal for the right. Socialist objectives included the establishment of civil rights, nationalization of the railroads, banks and mines, agrarian land reform, the creation of a secular educational system, the separation of church and state, and the right to divorce. In the interest of advancement of the Republic, the more pragmatic voices within the party tempered their enthusiasm in favor of a more moderate and collaborative attitude.

As conditions continued to deteriorate for the working classes, their reaction was to strike against those whom they perceived as the cause of their misery. The factory owners and landowners affected complained and the government applied pressure to the

labor unions to refrain. Acting as arbiter, the government had marginal success in achieving mutually acceptable solutions and, more often than not, it was the workers who felt as though they had lost. In some cases, strikes occurred in defiance of the government's as well as the union leadership's wishes. In response, the Civil Guard was called in, often with deadly results. The consequences of these various unsuccessful strikes and of the repressive measures taken to discourage them— oftentimes with much more zeal than intended by the government— was to solidify a strong opposition on the left. Brinton observes that, “after each crisis the victors tend to split into a more conservative wing holding power and a more radical one in opposition” (123). The right, quick to encourage these harsh reactions from the government, was only too pleased to add their criticism once the action had been taken. Through their artful media manipulation and use of propaganda, they were eventually able to win substantial popular support and gain influence within the government.

Within the first four years of the Republic's short tenure, there were numerous risings, both by the extreme left and right. The resulting effect on the Republic was, at the very least to create distraction from the tasks to which it had committed itself. Each time, rather than swift reprisals, the government offered conciliation. Admirable as that may sound, the effect was simply to add more instability to an already unstable equation. Consequently, the government continued to be seen as ineffectual on all counts. As Dolores “La Pasionaria” Ibarurri observed, “It appeared that Spain was on the threshold of a new epoch of progress and democratic development. But the illusions of those early days of Republican-Socialist euphoria were rapidly dispelled by the cold wind of

conservatism emanating from the new governing forces” (85). In fact, the moderates in power continued to temper their commitment to social reform in response to the growing influence of the rightist members.

Here, we must deviate from Brinton’s literal application of uniformities. “In his chapter entitled, “Dual Sovereignty,” he states, “Once the first stage in revolution is over, the struggle that arises between moderates and extremists comes to be a struggle between two rival governmental machines” (134). In our study, there is a triad, rather than a duo. This three-way division sealed the fate of the Republic, although many in a position to realize it and react in its defense were unable or unwilling to recognize it. As we have seen, while the right was less willing to collaborate and compromise, the center-left, for the most part was. The Socialists, especially saw their role as the defenders of the Republic and realized that their chances of promoting their ideals— albeit not on their desired timetable— were certainly better off under moderate rule than conservative. The government, however failed to recognize this fact and eventually relegated the Socialist influence to a lesser position than that of the more conservative voices. Meanwhile, the right wing feigned participation while plotting to once and for all overthrow the regime. When, on July 19, 1936, Generals Franco and Mola finally executed their well-planned uprising, the Republic was slow to react and, even when it did, it did not take advantage of the left wing’s willingness to aid in its defence. In fairness, there had been much rhetoric over the past few years of the leftist’s desire for a proletariat revolution in response to the government’s stalled reforms. Arming the left, in the eyes of centrist Republicans would have done more to hasten their defeat than facing the Fascist threat

alone. Soon, however, they realized the gravity of the situation. In agreeing to the assistance of the Socialists, Anarchists and Communists, the Republic opened the floodgates to the left wing and forever changed the face, and the fate of the legitimate government of Spain.

The Fascist's rising in July 1936 was well coordinated and well executed. Unlike the previous attempt of the right wing, the approach was systematic and divided into regional fronts with competent generals in charge of each. The government's response was slow and poorly coordinated. Considering the frequency in which both the left and right threatened to revolt, this lack of preparedness can be attributed to both incompetence and arrogance. In Brinton's final observation of the exploration of the rule of the moderates, he states, "the moderates are in all of our societies confronted sooner or later with the task of fighting a war; and they prove poor war leaders" (145). In fact, it quickly became clear that the Republic could not fend off the uprising even though there were a substantial number of troops still loyal. It wasn't until the order finally came to provide arms to the trade union militias that the rapid advance of the Fascists was finally slowed. Soon, some semblance of order within the defending ranks was achieved. Battle lines were drawn and the flesh of the Spanish landscape was slashed with the lacerations of early 20<sup>th</sup> century trench warfare. Anarchists, Communists, Socialists and Radicals alike eventually put aside their differences and, under the name of the "Popular Front," focused on their common goal of suppressing the forces of Fascism, whose fanatical nationalism and traditionalist values would quickly undo whatever advances the Socialists were able to achieve for the working class in collaboration with the

government. “First, win the War,” became the directive of the War Council of Madrid. The next step would be determined by whatever faction prevailed. The raised fist of the international popular movement accompanied battle cries of “*No Pasaran*” (they shall not pass). Party leadership mobilized their rank and file. Anarchists organized themselves in “collectivized” regiments, in which the ranking members were selected as a result of a majority vote. Socialist and Communist divisions adhered to more traditional military organizational schemes. Disagreements as to strategy and logistics were common but at the beginning of the conflict, at the front, there was only one enemy.

On both the left and right of the Republican government the factions were extreme in comparison with its moderate nature. In *The Anatomy of Revolution*, Brinton devotes his sixth chapter to “The Accession of the Extremists,” in which “they obtain [a] monopoly by ousting, usually in a series of conflicts, any and all active and effective opposition from these organizations” (149). On the right, the least extreme voices remained virtually silent. The brutality of the Fascists and Falangists discouraged infighting. On the left, however, this was not the case. As the war raged on and resources became scarce, outside support became necessary. The radical nature of the left created discomfort among democratic governments of the world, which may have otherwise been allies. Among other reasons, Anarchist appropriation of English and American corporate interests made official cooperation impossible. La Pasionaria notes, “the French bourgeoisie and the British capitalists did not want the Republic to triumph, for various reasons, among them the fact that they needed Spain as a poor, backwards neighbor on whom they could impose onerous and extortionist treaties. They saw Franco as a

defender of Spain's aristocracy and reactionary caste privileges. They aided the reaction, easing its way, and tied the hands of the Loyalists, denying that they even had the right to fight" (202). La Pasionaria's cynicism reflects the familiar Communist propaganda of the time in which she penned her autobiography, but there is undoubtedly some truth in her accusations. As the coming years would reveal, until push came to shove, the English, French and Americans would have no more stomach to face the German and Italian Fascists than the Spaniards. The bulk of foreign aid came instead from the Soviet Union, and that fact elevated the Spanish Stalinists to a new status with more influence within the government.

The Communist's consolidation of influence was ultimately aided by the alleged revolt within the Republic's ranks by the POUM, the anti-Stalinist Communist party's militia. In Barcelona, they were closely aligned with the FAI, the Anarchist group who had control of the telephone center. PSUC (Stalinists) and the Catalan president, Luis Companys accused them of inefficiencies and outright sabotage. The telephone exchange was assaulted by the PSUC and the POUM and FAI militia came to its defense. In George Orwell's account of the events in *Homage to Catalonia*, the actions of the PSUC and the Catalan government were unwarranted. Although he confesses that his opinion is based on mostly second hand knowledge, he was an active participant on the losing side in the street fighting and a fugitive from the purge that followed. In La Pasionaria's autobiography, she refers to the event as a "counterrevolution" and issues a strong indictment against the POUM for directly aiding the cause of the Fascists and even accuses them of being in Franco's employ. Depending on one's politics, the label of

extremist may be attached to either side, be it Socialist, Anarchist or Communist. After the events in Barcelona, the Communists and their call for a consolidation of military forces under a Republican army won out over the fractionalized, fragile alliances of various militia groups. Militia members were forced to swear allegiance to the new Republican army and those who refused were arrested and, in many cases, shot.

It is worth mentioning that the Fascists did not have an exclusive on extremist brutality. The militias were also notorious for the persecution of clerics and accused members of the opposition. According to Thomas, “the description in Ernest Hemmingway’s *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, of how the inhabitants of a small pueblo first beat the male members of the middle class and then flung them over a cliff, is near to the reality of what happened in the famous Andalusian town of Ronda” (263). Brinton points out that, “the old law courts cannot work, at least in their traditional manner. They are therefore supplemented by extraordinary courts, revolutionary tribunals, or are wholly transformed by new appointments and special jurisdictions” (172). In the case of the events described by Hemmingway, the beatings and subsequent executions were the result of a farcical trial held by the guerilla leader who had just “liberated” the town from the oppression of the traditionalists and fascist sympathizers. On the other side of the front, the Fascists wasted no time arresting and convicting anyone whom they felt was the least bit contrary to their ideals. Arguably the most famous of these victims was Federico Garcia Lorca. A popular poet and playwright, Lorca was among the 4000-estimated executed in Granada “between 26 July 1936 and 1 March 1939” (Thomas 253). Although he was not affiliated with any particular party, his political leanings were well

documented in his work. The fact that his brother in law was the Socialist mayor in Granada may have sealed his fate.

These atrocities on both sides do well to introduce Brinton's next set of uniformities. The Reign of Terror describes the extremist's attempt to exert control over the "outsider," who he defines as "the man who on the whole accepts what others do in politics..." (177). This control, however barbaric, is at least understandable considering the results of the more compassionate moderate government. The moderates' attempt at altruism— or, more probably, pragmatism— in the form of an extended the hand of reconciliation to the opposition consistently results in betrayal. Like the proverbial scorpion who promises not to sting the frog who transports it across the river, deception is in the extremist's nature. The true tragedy of any Reign of Terror lies with the likelihood that the extremist government will make no effort to differentiate between the benign outsider and the treacherous opposition. Of the thousands who were marched or trucked to their graves, it is doubtful that a significant number were a potential threat. On a less draconian scale, Brinton points to how the extremists attempt to control the outsider's perception of every-day life through the introduction of new names for established landmarks and other new or altered terminology. He mentions the French addressing each other as "citizen" and the Soviet's use of the socialist salutation, "comrade." The leftist extremists in Spain certainly conform to this observation. The Spanish salutation "Don" was discouraged as was the formal translation of "you:" *usted*, which was replaced with the more familiar *tu*. The traditional greeting, "*Buenos dias*" was replaced with "*salud*." The Spanish equivalent of "*my wife*" became, "*my*

*companion.*” Even bourgeois fashion was discouraged and the dress of the working class became the norm. In both extremist camps, morality was strictly enforced. Brinton observes, “There is a serious attempt by those in authority to eradicate the minor vices, as well as what some might feel inclined to call the major pleasures” (180). Prostitution and drunkenness were met with harsh punishment. Posters in Republican Spain chastised the drunkard as aiding and abetting the enemy. Another uniformity involves the confiscation of land from the vanquished in the name of the people. The most telling account on the side of the Popular Front comes from La Pasionaria who, when soliciting the loyalty of soldiers in the military barracks in Madrid, was asked by a peasant soldier what the Republic would do with the land if they were victorious. La Pasionaria said, “The land? The land will go to those who work it. Absentee ownership will be eliminated, so will the latifundium. A broad agrarian land reform will give the peasant the land he has dreamed of owning for so long” (200). Whether the Stalinists of Spain had any intention of seeing the land go to the peasants, they obviously planned on confiscating it from its present owners, “in the name of the people.” Brinton describes an enthusiasm among the extremists as religious in nature. Surely both sides conform well to this observation. The right, of course based much of their ideology on the traditions of their Spanish Catholicism, with its totalitarian rule reminiscent of the infamous Inquisition. The left also exhibited the zeal of religious fanaticism and justified their brutality against the monarchists, clerics and possessing classes through philosophical jargon no less absolutist in nature than the Catholic canon.

The Republic finally gave in to the pressure of the Italian and German backed Fascist regime. On February 27, 1939, President Manuel Azana resigned. On April 1, the Republic surrendered. Despite the efforts of the Popular Front and the help of the International Brigade, a regiment of volunteers from England, France, the United States, Poland, Germany, and Italy organized by the Communist party, the Republic was no match. According to the Cromwell Productions' *History of Warfare* video collection, in it's documentary *The Spanish Civil War*, somewhere between 100,000 and 150,000 soldiers were killed in battle. The reign of terror continued for years. Reprisals on the Republican side totaled approximately 50,000. Upwards of 200,000 were executed by the Fascists through 1944 in their effort to gain control of Spain. It wasn't until the fall of the Fascists in Germany and Italy and the public outcry against their brutality that Franco tempered his viciousness and attempted to address the concerns of the lower classes on at least a minimal level. Still, he ruled as a totalitarian dictator until his death in 1975.

Brinton's *Anatomy*, as delineated by his four case studies fits into a neat chronology. It may be that he has taken the liberty— certainly to a lesser degree than I have in this study— to summarize or glaze over relatively less dramatic events. The events in Spain throughout this period of time are not nearly as easily “pigeon holed” as Brinton's examples. It could be that each “swing” of the pendulum from right to left, conservative to liberal and back could be analyzed as a complete revolutionary cycle with different levels of intensity. Each swing to the right, for instance included not necessarily a “reign of terror,” the likes of which we saw after the establishment of the Second Republic and again after the establishment of Franco's Fascist regime, but instead a

milder “reign of fear” or at least a “reign of anxiety.” Crane Brinton admits that classifying historical events is not a neat and tidy process and that human nature negates any hope of regular predictability. The fate of the Spanish Republic was doomed from the start because of its compassionate and progressive nature. There was no way to alleviate the suffering of the working class without asking for the sacrifice of the upper classes. The Church’s promise of eternal reward in exchange for suffering silently on Earth had worn thin and the lower classes demanded more. There was no way that both extremes could achieve satisfaction since satisfaction hinged upon the destruction of the opposition. The Republic was Spain’s best chance for a society in which all people suffered a little but in which all people benefited. We may not have been able to observe the “perfect equilibrium,” to which Brinton refers but on our sliding scale of contentment, had the republic prevailed, I’m quite certain that everyone would have reaped the benefits of a more just and even-handed socio-economic system.

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